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Abstract 
Purpose 
The paper resolves a puzzle in the explanation of organisational change, where change appears to 
be within-form but results unintendedly in a transition between forms, yet first appearances 
suggest the absence of ‘noise’ of the kind expected during shifts between forms. 
 
Design/methodology/approach  
The paper uses qualitative analysis of primary archival and secondary sources on an historical case, 
analysing the data by coding using categories derived from neo-Durkheimian institutional theory. 
It examines the case of the cabinet, treated as an organisation, in the British government led by 
premier Harold Macmillan between 1959 and 1963, when a strategy for increasing hierarchy 
resulted unintendedly in an isolation dynamic. 
 
Findings  
It demonstrates that the neo-Durkheimian institutional approach can explain such puzzling cases. 
Appropriately for a special issue in honour of Mars’s work, it shows that his method of following 
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rule-violation and an adapted version of his concept of capture can provide a method of causal 
process tracing and a causal mechanism for resolving the puzzle. 
 
Research limitations/implications  
The argument is presented for purposes of theory development, not testing. It examines a single 
case study in depth. 
 
Practical implications  
n/a 
 
Social implications  
The findings demonstrate some of the risks which arise in changing informal institutional ordering, 
especially within decision-making executives, from the process by which informal institutions 
shape styles of judgement and decisions driven by those styles then feed back upon those executive 
bodies. 
 
Originality/value 
This is the first examination of puzzling unintended between-form transitions, the first to propose 
an adaptation of Mars’s concept of capture to resolve such puzzles, and the first detailed causal 
process tracing analysis of such a case using neo-Durkheimian institutional theoretic tools. It 
therefore offers a significant advance in institutional explanation of organisational change. 
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This article1 examines a puzzle in the explanation of organisational change – namely, how can 
change from one institutional form to another arise from a process which might usually be 
expected to bring a deepening or radicalisation within an institutional form? The puzzle is 
examined within the neo-Durkheimian institutional framework introduced by the anthropologist 
and social theorist, Mary Douglas (e.g., 1982 [1978], 1986), to the development of which Gerald 
Mars’s work has made some of the most important contributions. The next section introduces the 
framework’s theory of organisational change and sets up the puzzling type of case. Then three 
possible causal mechanisms for resolving the puzzle are considered, each taken from Mars’s work. 
The empirical section considers the case study of the cabinet and core executive, considered as an 
organisation, during the latter years of Harold Macmillan’s government in Britain in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s. The analysis section examines the case for evidence of any of the three 
mechanisms taken from Mars, concluding that his concept of capture can be adapted to enable 
the theory to explain cases of this puzzling kind. The conclusion draws out implications for the 
theory and for understanding institutional change. 
Change in the forms of institutions: a neo-Durkheimian theory 
Most institutional theories of organisations explain adoption and diffusion of empirical forms of 
formal institutions (e.g., M form in firms, district general form in hospitals, cabinet government), 
using cost, ideational or regulatory factors (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Scott 2008 [1995]; Scott 
and Meyer, 1994). Often, such frameworks predict only either gradual or catastrophic change 
(Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). By contrast, neo-Durkheimian traditions argue that informal 
                                                 
1 This work was supported by the Leverhulme Trust (grant number F01374I). I am grateful to Yochanan Altman for 
commissioning it for this themed issue of the journal, and to Chris Bellamy, Paul Richards, Jeroen Maesschalck, Peter 
John, Tony Bertelli and Brendon Swedlow for their advice on earlier drafts and on the argument. The article itself 
shows my intellectual debts to Gerald Mars which have been run up over many years and for which this piece is but 
a poor repayment. 
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institutions are causally key, that generic elementary forms are more significant than empirical ones, 
and that quite rapid informal institutional change is common. Building on his (1982 [1895], 45) 
argument that institutions defined as ‘modes of action and ... ways of judging which are 
independent of the particular individual will’ are central to social change, Durkheim 1995 [1912]) 
showed that elementary forms of institutions ritually cultivate ways of classifying; Goffman (1967) 
demonstrated that informal, quotidian conversation ritual interaction carries the same causal force. 
Douglas (1982 [1978]) developed a neo-Durkheimian typology of four elementary forms of 
institutions. She also shifted the explanandum to argue that each elementary institutional form (6, 
2014c) of social organisation cultivates a distinct thought style (Douglas, 1986), meaning the manner 
in which people frame decisions – measured, for example, by their stance toward anomalies in 
classification, past and future, issue linkage, risk, fallback options in strategy, issue linkages (6, 
2011). Thus, people paint their own social organisation in microcosm or in transposed forms on 
to ways of framing their problems, options, choices (Durkheim and Mauss, 1963 [1902-3], 11). 
Those elementary forms consist in basic structures of informal institutions, distinguished by the 
limited variation available on Durkheim’s (1951 [1897]; 1961 [1925]) two dimensions of social 
integration and social regulation. Social integration is the degree to which relations and actions are 
governed by accountability to bounded groups or conversely by significantly reduced attachments, 
save those pursued or abandoned instrumentally; social regulation is the degree to which social 
relations and activities are governed by accountability to rule and role and constraint by given fact 
or immutable condition, or conversely by discretion and scope for less fettered choices. 
 The elementary forms of informal institutions are strong social regulation and integration 
(hierarchical ordering); weak regulation and integration (individualistic ordering); strong regulation 
and weak integration (isolate ordering); and weak regulation and strong integration (enclaved 
ordering) (Douglas 1982 [1978], using her corrected 1996 terminology; 6, 2011). 
 Institutions amplify biases, leading people to think of their world as being only as integrated 
and regulated as they themselves are socially integrated and regulated by their institutions. The 
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theory therefore proposes a feedback loop, in which each elementary form of informal social 
organisation cultivates thought styles, which then leads people to act in ways that reinforce that 
form. This first phase of the theory’s feedback loop is the fundamental one (Douglas, 1986, 31-
43). In the second phase, though, these thought styles then lead people to act in ways which 
buttress those institutions (Figure One: 6, 2014a). 
[Figure One about here] 
 Institutions cultivate biases in people to seek, deliberately or otherwise, to deepen, amplify and 
reinforce that institutional ordering, both by blinkering against imagination of other possibilities 
and by cultivating institutional imperatives to operate in prescribe ways. This is positive feedback 
(6, 2003; Deutsch, 1966, 192; Douglas, 1983, 31-43; Douglas and Mars, 2003; Jervis, 1997, 146-
176). It gives rise to within-form change (6, 2003). Douglas and Mars (2003) emphasise these 
‘ratchets’ in radicalising dynamics in enclaves. Such transitions can be ‘quiet’ in the special sense 
that few people within the zone governed by the prevailing institutional form of organising 
question the change by deepening and reinforcement: any ‘noise’ takes the form of assertion of 
within-form imperatives (see Figure Two). 
[Figure Two about here] 
 This deepening can even reach the point of their disorganisation, through the undermining of 
other offsetting institutions, through forcing out anomalies and by creating imperatives for 
excessive reliance upon the instruments offered by those institutions (Durkheim, 1951 [1897]; 
1984 [1893], Bk III). Mars studied just such a process of reinforcement to the point of 
disorganisation in his (2007) work on an Italian family restaurant. 
 When people are disadvantaged, disappointed (a mechanism stressed by Thompson et al, 1990) 
or cast asunder by institutional reinforcement in one elementary form of organisation, institutions 
cultivate reasons to try to behave in ways which will assert other forms of organisation against the 
first one. This is the case of corrective, dampening, countervailing or negative feedback (Deutsch, 
1966, 88; Jervis, 1997, 125-146), which is the key process for bringing about between-form change. 
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Mars studied these dynamics in his (2007) work on the ‘takeover’ of a group of consultants by one 
of its members, and in his early work with Altman (Mars and Altman, 1983) on the emergence of 
individualistic ordering in response to the pursuit of hierarchy in Soviet Georgia. Normally, this 
sort of change is ‘noisy’ in the sense that discontent is voiced by someone claiming to speak for 
the disappointed, disadvantaged or excluded (see Figure Three). 
[Figure Three about here] 
 Similarly, it is straightforward to understand how both self-reinforcement and countervailing 
can take place unintendedly. In unintended negative feedback, noise will be ‘sotto voce’ – that is to 
say, it will be evident in (for example) evasive or circumventive or counter-exploitative behaviour. 
 But this account of the dynamics of change raises a fundamental theoretical and empirical 
puzzle. How are cases to be explained, which appear to be ones of unintended transitions between 
forms without any great evidence of the phenomena which are the hallmarks of negative feedback, 
even in their ‘sotto voce’ behavioural manifestations, because people working under a given set of 
institutions believe that they are actually pursuing goals which amount to within-form change? Can 
the neo-Durkheimian institutional framework satisfactorily handle cases of quiet unintended transition 
between forms? Presumably, the approach must either explain them, by arguing that if we look 
carefully, we shall find either sotto voce behaviour or noise; alternatively, it must accept them as 
genuine but find different mechanisms from its repertoire to explain them. 
 One apparently straightforward Durkheimian answer to the puzzle of whether and how within-
form effort can lead unintendedly to between-form transitions is presumably inconsistent with the 
fundamental axioms of the theory. The theory holds that the four elementary forms are the sources 
of causal force for change, whereas Durkheim’s two dimensions of social regulation and social 
integration by which the forms are distinguished are measures of variation only. Neither strong 
and weak regulation nor strong and weak integration constitute separate causal dynamics that 
could, of themselves, bring about effects upon the other dimension. Rather, their combinations 
carry the two feedback dynamics. Therefore, it cannot be a full explanation that, for example, 
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efforts to deepen hierarchy (which may well be intended in effect, although not people are unlikely 
to use that social science term) in fact reinforce only strong regulation but thereby weaken 
integration unintendedly to produce isolate ordering. This statement might be a correct neo-
Durkheimian description of a trajectory (see Figure Four). Yet it must be given an explanation in terms 
of the interaction of elementary forms with empirical-level features of the means by which 
intended action met particular constraints or answered the actions of others. In this case, it must 
be something about the particular way that people sought to deepen hierarchy that led to weakening 
integration. But what could the content of the directed causal arrow labelled ‘A’ in Figure Four 
be? 
[Figure Four about here] 
Quiet transitions between forms, contrary to intentions: method and 
mechanisms 
Mars’s work suggests three possible ways in which the neo-Durkheimian institutional approach 
could deal with the puzzle. The first explains apparent quiet unintended between-form change 
arising from intended within-form change as cases where actors are misled by their own blinkers 
about what counts as behaviour that will sustain within-form deepening or perpetuation. Mars’s 
(1988) explains transitions in Israeli kibbutzim from enclave to other forms in this way. He argues 
that blinkering effects of the enclaving were so great that boundary-spanning work was not 
recognised as blurring those boundaries and thereby changing the predominant organisational 
form. 
 The second possibility explains these cases by arguing, as Mars (2007) did in his study on the 
Michelin-starred family-run restaurant in Emilia-Romagna, that what where such noise as is 
evident appears to be within-form in character, what is really going on is self-disorganising positive 
feedback, and that disorganisation opens space either for a recrudescence of the same form but in 
new units (e.g., schism in the enclaved family restaurant) or else for replacement by other forms 
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when the first form is no longer effectively operative and so no longer needs to be revolted against, 
circumvented or evaded or controlled (e.g., new individualistically run restaurants by refugees from 
the former enclave). 
 A third strategy, which Mars also deploys in the (1988) study and also in his (2009) study on 
the East End warehouse, is again to explain the anomalous appearance of quiet contrary-to-
intended between-form change by showing how the process of ‘capture’ of key resources occurred, 
but was legitimated within the moral vocabulary of the first form while actually constituting a 
change in power relations which brought about a shift toward new forms. Both strategies resolve 
the anomaly by showing that what is really going is sotto voce or behavioural negative feedback. 
 If Mars’s strategy of explaining what appear to be cases of quiet contrary-to-intended between-
form change is to be sustained, then it must not only deal with hard cases, but it must also enable 
us empirically to distinguish between ‘blinkering’ as negative feedback presented as the ‘continued 
rhetoric’ of positive feedback, self-disorganising positive feedback which clears space for between-
form replacement, and negative feedback by quiet ‘capture’. 
 Mars’s central claim about how, empirically, this might be done, as a matter of method, rests 
on the insight in his (1982) classic study, Cheats at work. That book argued that each elementary 
form cultivates a distinct style in which rules are broken, and officially sanctioned norms are 
violated, circumvented or subverted. Violation of norms, just as Durkheim (1982 [1895]) argued 
in his scandalous claim about the ‘normality’ of crime, is not only a feature of disorganised phases 
of the elementary forms, but of their organising and provisionally viable forms too. Throughout 
his career, Mars’s work on crime, deviance and unethical behaviour has not merely treated these 
things as interesting explananda, but as key issues for methodology. For Mars, social organisation 
must be measured in its register of rule-breaking, for attending to rule-making and rule-compliance 
alone is both incomplete and risks misleading the researcher, because differences of thought style 
are sometimes clearer in the register of rule-breaking than they are in the register of rule-
compliance. Mars’s argument leads us to expect that understanding the different roles that routine 
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and normal violation of officially sanctioned rules and norms play will tell us in cross-sectional 
analysis which forms is pre-eminent, and in diachronic studies help us distinguish causal pathways 
of within- and between-form change. Thereby, we are enabled to distinguish between cases of 
blinkering and continued rhetoric covering negative feedback, and capture and disorganisation 
which opens up space, by their different patterns of rule-violation. 
 In quiet unintended transitions between forms by blinkering and continued rhetoric, we might 
expect rule-violation to be of a kind that actually sustains blinkering and bias in, say, hierarchical 
mode, even when its effect on organisation is to shift informal institutions toward isolate ordering. 
In that case, it must reinforce misplaced trust. If, on the other hand, capture is behind what appear 
at first sight to be quiet contrary-to-intended between-form changes, then we might expect the 
process of capture itself to be a violation or else to lead to new opportunities for violation. It 
should rest more heavily upon power rather than on trust. In disorganisation, we should expect 
rule-violation to be of a form which will undermine well-placed trust. The disorganisation and 
replacement mechanism is therefore the reverse of blinkering in the register of rule violation and 
trust, while capture lies orthogonally to them both. Table One summarises the contrasts among 
the three mechanisms. 
[Table One about here] 
 Another possibility is that two or all three mechanisms might be operating simultaneously. In 
that case, the challenge of distinguishing between them empirically becomes both more important 
and more difficult, in the quantity of data needed and in the confidence that can be attached to 
coding. 
 This article uses a case study of what appears to be a hard case of apparent quiet, contrary-to-
intended between-form change, to examine whether any of these three strategies derived from 
Mars’s work might satisfactorily explain it either as a case of negative feedback (blinkering or 
capture) or as one of positive feedback leading to disorganisation and replacement. If any of these 
approaches can work on a hard case, then the neo-Durkheimian institutional approach is 
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buttressed. If on the other hand, none provides a convincing explanation, then either a new 
strategy of explaining such cases is needed, or else the neo-Durkheimian tradition would need to 
recognise such cases for what they appear to be, and find some way to accommodate them. In 
either situation, therefore, some gain in theoretical development should be achieved. 
Case study, data, coding and background  
This article considers organisational change in Harold Macmillan’s cabinet in British government 
between 1957 and 1963, with special reference to the final three years. 
 Cabinets are organisations: in constitutional law, they have defined status, tasks, powers and 
authority, responsibilities and internal structure of roles, a defined membership and rules for 
recruitment and dismissal. They are supported by a discrete secretariat under a Permanent 
Secretary like any other department of state. Full and committee meetings are regularised. Their 
external relations with parties and departments of state exhibit all the features of open systems. 
We shall see below how decision-making is undertaken in response to events, feedback from public 
opinion and interest groups, etc. Yet government’s interior cores are not passive, merely 
responding to external forces: they have a rich organisational life of internal dynamics and informal 
institutions. 
 Cabinets in British government provide good case studies to test theories of organisational 
change, because we have rich sources of publicly available data about them. This article draws on 
an extensive study using ministerial papers released into the National Archives after thirty years as 
well as ministers’ private papers archived in Oxford, Cambridge and London, undertaken to test a 
neo-Durkheimian theory of political judgement in selected fields of public policy by comparing 
the impacts of contrasting social organisation upon thought styles in the three governments (6, 
forthcoming). To code governments for changes in informal social organisation, greatest use was 
made of ministers’ and senior civil servants’ diaries, memoirs, biographies, some secondary 
historical studies, and archived personal papers; some information can be found in papers in the 
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National Archives on changing formal institutions of social organisation. Almost every published 
diary, memoir and biography for a cabinet minister in these governments was read, numbering 
some forty books for Macmillan’s government, as well as 50 articles and a similar number of 
secondary historiographical books. Each of these sources was therefore read and annotated for 
provisional codes indicating aspects of elementary form, and whether they applied to a whole 
government or a distinct zone within it. Codes for social organisation in governments were those 
of positions and relations within elementary forms (6, forthcoming), such as superior and subaltern 
in hierarchy, patron and client in individualism, structural despot and structural serf in isolate 
ordering. Diaries, memoirs and biographies reveal information about social organisation in 
government in a huge variety of ways, ranging from overt discussion of the issue through to 
presentation of events which exhibit the nature of relations, relative power, dependency and 
independence. Codes from the entire set of sources for each government were then identified 
chronologically, aggregated and compared. Inconsistencies in coding from different sources were 
resolved by revisiting the full set to sources to identify miscoding. Typically, miscoding arose from 
considering events in isolation rather than against the wider pattern of contemporaneous events 
in a government. High level codes for elementary forms were assembled by aggregating measures 
of style and either identifying relative weightings or, where possible, relations between forms in 
each government’s mix during each phase. Codes for thought style focused on the values taken on 
strategy schedule (e.g., fallbacks and reserve preferences: 6, 2015b), stance toward anomaly, risk, 
past and future, reliance upon guile, issue linkage, classification style: many are standard codes (e.g., 
Thompson, 1992, 199-202), while others have developed specifically for studying political 
decisionmaking (6, 2011). In coding for styles of judgement, greatest use was made of ministerial 
and cabinet papers released into the National Archives. This article focuses particularly on 
industrial relations. For the Macmillan and Douglas-Home governments, 120 files from the 
National Archives were digitally photographed in whole or in relevant parts amounting to 18,000 
photographs of documents, and 35 key Cabinet Conclusions downloaded. Some 30 books and 25 
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articles of secondary history were examined. All were read and all were annotated in detail, with 
provisional codes applied on measures of stance toward anomaly, strategy, risk, time, issue linkage. 
Again, these codes were aggregated for each government’s work on each policy issue, compared, 
and where inconsistencies appeared, the sources were revisited and miscodings identified to 
eliminated inconsistencies. Again, styles of political judgement are exhibited in decisions rather 
than stated baldly. Therefore, coding cannot be mechanical but must be done inferentially. That is 
to say, alternative possible codes must be considered, implications derived for expectations about 
associated aspects of a decision (including other codes), and full sets of sources re-examined to 
look for evidence of those expected associated aspects. The full monograph from the study (6, 
forthcoming) presents a number of these inferential arguments for and against candidate codings 
in detail. 
 Table Two presents a list of key individuals who figure in the case study.  
[Table Two about here] 
Macmillan acceded to the premiership in 1957 after Eden’s resignation following the Suez debâcle. 
He quickly restored Britain’s relations with the US, going on in 1961 to develop excellent relations 
with President Kennedy. In 1959, Macmillan led the Conservatives to their third consecutive 
victory, with an increased majority. The government pursued an extensive programme of 
decolonisation, in which Iain Macleod played a key role. In cold war policy, Macmillan made 
important contributions to the achievement of the first Test Ban Treaty; the foreign secretary, 
Home, was pivotal in diplomacy over Laos at Geneva. As Chancellor from 1960 until 1962, Selwyn 
Lloyd introduced major changes in economic policy, including the establishment of the tripartite 
National Economic Development Council. In the last year of his premiership, Macmillan’s 
government was deeply damaged by the Profumo affair, although De Gaulle’s veto of Britain’s 
first application for membership of the European Economic Community was a much bigger policy 
setback. In October 1963, Macmillan resigned due to ill-health, and the Conservatives continued 
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in office for another year under Home, who disclaimed his peerage and became Sir Alec Douglas-
Home to fight and win a seat in the Commons in order to enter Number 10. 
 Eden’s administration had moved rapidly into isolate ordering in which Eden himself 
increasingly occupied the position of the ‘structural despot’ (Coyle, 1994; 6, 2011, 2014a,b; 2015a), 
but after the Suez fiasco damaged him, the prime minister was effectively forced to retreat into a 
‘structural serf’ position. The leadership contest led, predictably, to a short period of 
predominantly individualistic ordering in which Butler and Macmillan and their claques competed 
for power. On Macmillan’s victory, the lightly refashioned government moved quickly into a 
largely hierarchical ordering. Butler accepted his subaltern position; by contrast with Wilson’s 
Labour government, no other minister sought to develop a claque of personal clients; nor was 
there any personal ‘kitchen cabinet’ in Number 10. After the 1958 crisis when the chancellor and 
junior finance ministers’ resigned (Cooper, 2011) and after Lord Salisbury’s early departure, there 
were few voluntary ministerial resignations until 1962. Macmillan’s series of reshuffles were, until 
the drama of 1962, as much driven by hierarchical ‘fine-tuning’ adjustments as the government’s 
approach to managing the economy was. After Thorneycroft’s departure, Macmillan rarely 
negotiated with ministers for their support. Macmillan’s system of policy reviews set a framework, 
but he avoided micro-management. Disagreements among ministers, such as the famous ones that 
Macleod had with Home and Sandys were driven by departmental rather than personal interests. 
Yet a zone of individualistic ordering remained in high foreign policy matters of relations with the 
superpowers for the prime minister and between the premier and his foreign and commonwealth 
secretaries and, after 1961, the minister responsible for negotiating with the EEC over the British 
membership application. However, Washington’s decisions over Suez had reinforced Britain’s 
subaltern position in a western alliance which all Conservatives could now appreciate was 
hierarchically ordered. That experience, with the US disapproval of his 1959 Moscow trip (Mauer, 
1998) curbed Macmillan’s efforts to contravene directly expressed presidential views. Enclaving 
was confined to a marginalised imperialist clique on the backbenches around Salisbury; when 
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Powell and Thorneycroft returned to government, even the possibility of a proto-monetarist 
enclave was extinguished. 
 To show the relationship in Figure One between social organisation and thought style in 
judgement, the case study considers these aspects in turn before examining the change dynamic. 
Transition to isolate ordering: informal institutional organisation 
During 1961 and 1962, the government’s institutional ordering changed significantly, and the 
manner of that change appears at first sight to be a case of quiet, contrary-to-intended change 
from a predominantly hierarchical ordering to one in which isolate ordering was very significant; 
from now on, this will be referred to as an ‘isolation dynamic’ (6, 2015a). 
 Within the limits of description rather than explanation, Figure Four captures something of 
the dynamic. For in a series of respects, Macmillan and his colleagues together sought to increase 
social regulation within the cabinet after the 1959 election victory. Cabinet committees were 
restructured; reshuffles were occasions for clarifying divisions of labour; policy reviews were used 
to provide greater overarching coherence. Macmillan increased pressure on his chancellors to 
secure prime ministerial approval for their plans not only a greater extent than both he and his 
predecessors had done for many years. The rubric of ‘modernisation’ was used for the series of 
policy reviews which, as Party Chairman, Macleod was asked to undertake, jointly with the 
Conservative Research Department (CRD); Butler given the role of coordinating cabinet 
committees to plan policy ahead using ideas from Macleod’s and CRD’s work. 
 This pursuit of social regulation was mirrored in the style of political judgement, where a more 
regulated approach was adopted in several fields of policy. Selwyn Lloyd’s ‘July measures’ of 1961 
represented not only the instituting of a growth target and the deepening of ‘fine-tuning’ with the 
introduction of ‘regulators’ in taxation, but the first steps toward what would become a clear 
incomes policy and a more dirigiste approach to investment and industrial policy (Pemberton, 2004).  
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 The style of political judgement initially appeared to pursue greater social integration on the 
wider scale. The decision to establish the National Economic Development Council and to 
negotiate with the employers and trades unions’ representative bodies to secure their participation 
(Ringe and Rollings, 2000) was a high-profile example of a more socially integrated, tripartite 
approach to economic management. In machinery of government reform, the instauration, 
following the Plowden Committee Report, of the Public Expenditure Survey Committee (PESC) 
constituted a major innovation in seeking to integrate as well as regulate public spending 
management across the whole of government. 
 Yet the pursuit of integration in the style of political judgement was not matched by deepening 
of integration in the social organisation of the government itself; rather the reverse. Macmillan’s 
relations with his ministers began to change from 1960 onward. He made the initial decision to 
pursue EEC membership and pushed it through the cabinet, against considerable scepticism and 
reservation. Increasingly, he pressured Selwyn Lloyd at the Treasury for additional expansion, thus 
worsening his relation with his chancellor. Yet on the other hand, Macmillan also grew increasingly 
withdrawn (Lowe, 1997, 606), for two distinct proximate reasons – namely, increasingly frequent 
illness after summer 1961 and an increasingly punishing schedule of international travel and 
personal commitment to his reserved zone of individualistic ordering in foreign policy relations 
with the superpowers. Butler often had to resume the role of stand-in premier but without the 
authority of the office, and was left decreasingly secure, but also separated from his former 
protégés; unsurprisingly, Butler responded by showing less loyalty (Howard, 1987, 249-294). 
Macmillan’s health and travel meant that his micro-managing was spasmodic and unpredictable 
rather than continuous. In short, Macmillan’s position was shifting toward that of a structural 
despot in an isolate ordering, but it never fully arrived there. 
 In early 1962, Macmillan began to lose faith in his Chancellor, although the policies on which 
his discontent focused were ones to which he had readily assented. By-election losses to the 
Liberals unnerved Macmillan and made him more critical of Selywn Lloyd. He began to plan 
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another of his limited reshuffles. Yet he dithered for weeks over its scope (Thorpe, 2010, 519-
525). In July 1962, Butler, whose loyalty had weakened, was indiscreet with a journalist, causing 
Macmillan to panic, to a degree that he had rarely done before the isolation dynamic set in. This 
led to the most drastic reshuffle in decades, dubbed ‘the night of the long knives’ (Horne, 1989, 
339-550). Macmillan sacked seven senior ministers, including several longstanding friends. The 
reshuffle only served to make the premier even more dependent on the newly appointed ministers 
but it also undermined the capacity for trust among the new ministers, who had seen what had 
befallen their colleagues. Deference to prime ministerial policy preferences now became much 
more central. The episode did not mark the beginning of the isolation dynamic, but rather 
deepened it and provided an index of how deep it had already become. 
 Nonetheless, in rather separate field of foreign policy, the zone of individualistic ordering 
remained more or less intact. Macmillan continued to press actively for negotiated solutions to a 
variety of issues from Rhodesia to Laos, delegating the latter to Home. He and Home played 
constructive roles during the Cuban missile crisis, despite Britain’s limited effective power. During 
1963, Macmillan had the energy both to negotiate determinedly with Kennedy for Polaris, after 
McNamara’s Pentagon had decided to scrap the Skybolt system on which the British had been 
encouraged to count. He played a significant role in negotiations for the Test Ban Treaty about 
nuclear weapons. These cases show that the issue was not one of declining personal competence 
in Macmillan individually, but of changing structure in the government. The deepest effects of the 
isolation dynamic were felt in domestic affairs, because in foreign affairs the patron-client relations 
which bound Home, Maudling (while still at the Colonial Office) and Heath (Lord Privy Seal, 
minister for the EEC negotiations) to Macmillan remained intact as a basis of social organisation 
on which the prime minister felt able to rely.  
 After the 1962 reshuffle, isolate ordering became, if anything, even more marked, but its 
character changed subtly during 1963. Cohesion among ministers atrophied still further, as the 
Profumo affair showed, when it became clear that the war minister had not merely engaged in an 
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affair with a call girl, but lied about it to his colleagues to try to hang on to his position, until he 
was exposed. Had Sandys not been prevented by little more than brute insistence from resigning 
over other allegations, probably true, of a sexual indiscretion, the government’s cohesion might 
have broken down irreparably. 
 Whereas Macmillan in 1961-2 had appeared to be drifting into a structurally despotic position, 
the damage done to his authority by sacking so many of his longest standing colleagues checked 
that process. When De Gaulle’s veto of Macmillan’s EEC application came in December 1962, 
the premier’s authority was deeply damaged. Around this time, Macmillan was privately willing to 
contemplate not fighting the next election as prime minister and party leader, partly for reasons 
for failing health. The Profumo affair suggested to many that he now had less power over his 
ministers. These setbacks shifted him more toward the position of the structural serf, unable to 
attempt the kind of imposition by which isolate despots sustain themselves and falling back on 
improvisation.  
Transition to isolate ordering: political judgement and feedback upon social 
organisation 
The isolation dynamic brought about corresponding changes, as Figure One leads us to expect, in 
the style of political judgement, the register in which thought style is articulated in government (6, 
2011). The isolate style of political judgement affected many fields of policymaking. But only in 
some politically very central fields did the changing style of judgement about particular policy 
problems exhibit sufficiently strong ‘second phase’ or ‘lower loop’ feedback effects upon the 
government’s social organisation. 
 In the postwar decades, governments’ authority rested heavily on their perceived capability to 
manage the nexus which linked micro-economic policy issues of industrial relations and wages and 
incomes policy with macro-economic ones of the balance of payments deficit, the sterling-dollar 
exchange, and the timings of fiscal expansion and deflation. In 1959-60, the increase in 
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formalisation of hierarchical management had appeared reasonably coherent. In the following year, 
intellectual integration was deepened just as social integration among ministers was. The 
government held firm against the 1960 unofficial seamen’s strike, while restraining itself from the 
kinds of restrictive legislation on trades unions which some Conservative backbenchers demanded. 
The Guillebaud report was commissioned in order to provide a comprehensive, integrated, rule-
based system for the governance of pay relativities across the rail industry, to be a model for other 
nationalised industries but in fact a microcosm, in exaggerated form, in its thought style of 
government’s own informal hierarchical relations; unfortunately, it was published just as the 
government itself was just beginning to move beyond those relations into its isolation dynamic; 
indeed, Macmillan’s dismayed response to it reflected his recognition of the risks of ratchet effects 
in hierarchy. Nonetheless, the July 1961 measures still seemed to provide an integrated and 
regulated framework for economic policy. 
 Yet as the government slipped into its isolation dynamic, anomalies in its policy framework 
grew in significance which the government seemed unable to contain. The growing centrality of 
incomes policy norms left the Ministry of Labour’s role as provider of good offices for conciliation 
increasingly anomalous. The prospect of Guillebaud’s grand settlement gave incentives for the rail 
unions to threaten to strike to increase their leverage, knowing that Guillebaud would be likely to 
be generous. The British Transport Commission and the transport minister had strong 
departmental incentives to pursue industrial peace, while the unions saw an opportunity for 
exploiting anomalies in any grand scheme in order to ensure the continuation of ‘leapfrogging’. 
Macmillan and Butler had to retreat, and accepted a settlement above their pay target for their 
industry. In each subsequent year, a similar story unfolded, especially when Beeching took over 
the rail industry and manoeuvred to support the unions demands, sometimes threatening to resign 
if his demands were not met. When Hare took over at the Ministry of Labour, he began the first 
tentative steps toward legal re-regulation of trades unions with his legislation to stipulate that 
threatening strike action constituted a termination of a worker’s employment contract, yet the 
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government’s capacity to contain trades union wage pressure on a case by case basis augured ill 
for their ability to rely on such legislation. The very pursuit of a grand rule-based, integrated scheme 
opened opportunities for disintegration, and the government’s weakening cohesion left it unable 
to respond save by coping and adaptation. 
 The 1961 ‘pay pause’ in the public sector provoked trades union fury because it overrode 
arbitration and other existing dispute resolution machinery. Selwyn Lloyd felt forced to tell the 
unions that the government would review the pause ‘in the new year’ (PREM 11/5159. 22.11.61),2 
which signalled clearly that the ‘pause’ would not last the full planned year. Manoeuvres began 
immediately, in preparation to exploit the anomalies in relativities generated by months of the 
‘pause’, and duly the ‘pause’ broke down.  
 Managing the policy began to erode integration among ministers. In October 1961, Richard 
Wood, minister of power gave no instruction to the Electricity Council not to settle above the 
norm. Ironically, Minister of Labour John Hare, who had first suggested making concessions, 
rounded on Wood to cover his own position (PREM 11/4066. 17.11.61). Wood was left exposed 
by an official statement that the agreement violated the policy. Macmillan asked another minister 
to ‘keep an eye’ on Wood in subsequent gas negotiations. When the pay pause broke down, the 
government felt unable to pursue a structurally despotic strategy of passing on constraints by 
imposition. 
 In the rail negotiations in 1962, the Treasury felt that Beeching’s threat to resign from the 
board effectively held them to ransom. Macmillan began to operate with some guile, meeting the 
rail director in secret. In what were effectively negotiations, Macmillan gave the rail unions a broad 
hint that settling within the 3% offered in the spring would lead to a more generous increase in 
the autumn. To deal with a short-term problem, Macmillan unilaterally undermined his own policy 
(PREM 11/4003. 14.2.62). The consequential concessions that had to be made in 1963 only added 
                                                 
2 NB: all references in this format are to dated documents in files in the National Archives at Kew. 
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to wage inflation (PREM 11/5131. 8.5.63). Macmillan blamed Lloyd for poor preparation of the 
replacement scheme, but his own ideas for what became the ‘guiding light’ were no better a 
resolution. What had been intended as a ceiling soon became a floor (Dorey, 2009, 157) and 
ministers accepted that they would settle above the norm (O’Hara, 2004, 32). Macmillan sacked 
Lloyd in the July 1962 reshuffle for the thing of which he was himself guilty – namely inconsistency 
of signalling and incoherence in the relation between industrial relations and incomes policy. 
 By 1963, the policy incoherence was stark. Maudling’s expansionary macro-economic policy 
was clearly signalling to the unions their opportunities for demanding settlements above the 
government’s pay norm. Meanwhile, the government’s imagination for grand regulation and 
integration of policy went into overdrive, far ahead of political practicality. Grandiose schemes 
were developed for detailed governance of prices, incomes and even dividends in pursuit of a 
chimerical grand bargain with the trades unions at the NEDC. Yet even modest plans for a 
redundancy pay scheme could not be got through the cabinet (O’Hara, 2004, 32-7). Only after 
Macmillan had left Downing Street did ministers take an interest again in a strategic review of 
industrial relations law. 
 The fact that micro-economic policy came to be handled in ways that involved the use of guile, 
asking ministers secretly to watch each other for the prime minister, a premier blaming ministers 
for decisions to which he was himself a principal party, cutting secret-deals with key stakeholders 
without telling ministers, show the extent to which political judgement in the field of micro-
economic policy fed back to reinforce the isolation dynamic within the social organisation of the 
cabinet. 
Rule-violation 
The isolation dynamic exhibits several important kinds of rule-violation, in distinct roles. Some 
constitute violations of informal rules of social organisation under hierarchical institutions about 
collegiality. Many of these take the form of the cultivation of distinct kinds of guile, but several of 
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Macmillan’s ministers sacked in July 1962 regarded their dismissals as violations of such norms 
too. Other cases are violations of more formal rules established in policy. Most of these violations 
have already been mentioned, including Macmillan’s deals with Beeching kept secret from his 
colleagues, or his willingness to tip the wink to the rail unions that accepting a modest settlement 
in one pay round would be rewarded with an inflationary one in the next round, or in hanging a 
colleague out to dry. One more might be cited, which was the decision to institute a review of 
security following one of the spy scandals, when in fact there was no serious intention to make 
substantive changes, but the priority was simply to distract the press from criticism of the 
government for the handling of the particular scandal. 
 Mars’s emphasis on rule-violations can be understood as a development of Douglas’s (1966) 
method, which was to identify the anomalies generated in thought style as key indicators of social 
organisation, and then to explain those anomalies by reference to the dynamics in social 
organisation which generate those anomalies and the ways in which people are biased to deal with 
them. A distinction is drawn in 6 (2013) between the generation of anomalies in styles of thought, 
and the style of their management in response to their generation: in positive feedback, the styles 
in which ‘monsters’ (Bloor, 1982) are managed often only serve to reinforce the generation of 
more anomalies.  
 Table Three summarises the principal types of violation found in the Macmillan government’s 
isolation dynamic. The table shows that the growing trend toward violations in each of these 
registers provides an index of the depth of the isolation dynamic. More important for the present 
purpose, though, is the chronological movement from right to left in the table, which provides 
evidence for the role of rule-violation in the ‘second phase’ of the neo-Durkheimian feedback 
loop. For the right hand side external policy anomalies were already clear by 1960-1, and beginning 
to lead to the left-hand side behaviours internally. In effect, rule-violation of the right hand side 
external policy-oriented kinds pushed the second phase of the feedback loop within isolate 
ordering toward rule-violations of the left hand side, or internal kinds, which provide an index of 
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the degree to which disorganisation might eventually have been threatened, had the government 
lasted sufficiently long. 
[Table Three about here] 
Quiet unintended transition between forms 
The transition in Macmillan’s government provides a good case study to study the puzzle, because 
Macmillan’s intention to deepen both social regulation and integration was generally shared by his 
ministers. There was little enclaving within the cabinet; no zone of individualism opened up to 
allow rivals to become patrons; and isolate ordering was not deepened as a result of very strong 
articulation prior to 1961 (as would be the case under Heath, for isolate ordering was very 
significant in the Conservative leadership led by Heath even in opposition: 6, 2015a). The 
government slipped into isolate ordering while intending to seek what can only be coded as 
hierarchical institutions, and without great resistance to the ideal of hierarchy being provoked. 
 Only when the change in institutional ordering was largely complete, by the time of the July 
1962 reshuffle, was there a great deal of ‘noise’ in the sense that the term is used here. For much 
of the period, any discontent in the government itself was expressed in terms of demands for 
greater integration and greater regulation of policy-making. Although some backbenchers outside 
the zone of governmental institutional ordering could be found calling for different kinds of 
organising principle within the government, none of them wanted the isolate form which emerged. 
After the transition in informal ordering to a mix in which isolate ordering was much more 
significant, discontent was obvious among many, especially after the reshuffle and most obviously 
among the losers. The complaint from dismayed Conservatives was that the reshuffled 
government was a hierarchy with the prime minister more clearly at its apex but on too narrow a 
base of expertise and opinion within the party to command wider authority for the prime minister 
personally as an individual patron in what they imagined was still in part an individualistic patron-
client ordering in the parliamentary party, not that the government’s hierarchical institutions had 
  23 
been eroded. Indeed, the fact that the new Chancellor, Maudling, held views on economic 
management much more strongly integrated with the prime minister’s, was taken at face value as 
indicating social integration within the narrower government. 
 The ‘noise’, then, was of the kind expected in positive not in negative feedback, yet the result 
was a transition between forms: in the negative feedback register the transition was a ‘quiet’ one. 
Figure Four’s description of the case appears correct, that deepening social regulation caused the 
weakening of social integration, but this provides no explanation that is consistent with the neo-
Durkheimian framework. The fundamental neo-Durkheimian argument is supported, that the 
informal institutions of social organisation in the government explain its thought style, both in its 
most hierarchical and in its isolate phases, but the machinery has not yet been shown to explain 
the transition. 
Explaining the puzzle 
Can any of Mars’s three mechanisms provide an explanation consistent with the neo-Durkheimian 
framework? 
 Consider first the possibility of blinkering. Consideration of the description of the mechanism 
against the data in case study reveals a central theoretical weakness in the argument for such a 
mechanism which may not be obvious when it is presented in the abstract. The core neo-
Durkheimian argument is that currently operative institutions do the blinkering. Departed institutions 
should not have the lingering after-effects that this mechanism appears to suppose. In the case 
study, it is true that Conservative ministers and backbenchers did not appreciate the scale of the 
shift from hierarchy until quite late in 1963 after Profumo’s lie had been exposed; they presumed 
that what remained was simply a weakened and narrowed hierarchy. But this mistake was the effect 
of the limited information available to them, rather than a ghostly causal after-effect of institutions 
that had already decayed. 
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 Secondly, consider disorganisation and replacement. Here, the mechanism fails for empirical 
reasons. The chronology of the transition exhibits no clear caesura. Nor indeed, if the case is a 
genuine example of quiet unintended transition of the kind that is puzzling to explain should we 
expect a clear hiatus of the kind predicted. 
 This leaves the remaining possibility of capture, stolen rather than continued rhetoric, reliance 
upon power and less upon trust, and other actors fail to recognise the change until it is complete 
because of the guile used by the actors who engage in capture. The analysis offered of the transition 
shows that this does provide an explanation, but not at all in the way that Mars envisaged in his 
study on the East End warehouse, and with one key qualification of a kind that is consistent with 
Douglas’s and Mars’s arguments in their work on, of all things, enclaves. In the present case study, 
the project of capture was undertaken, not by the formally weaker party (the warehouse workers, 
in Mars’s study) but by the actor who was, on the measure of the formal institutions, the superior 
in the hierarchical ordering – namely, the prime minister himself. From 1960 onward Macmillan 
himself ‘captured’ the collective process of deepening hierarchical ordering. What began with 
policy reviews, delegation and new committee structures was seized by the premier trying to secure 
greater personal control over the Treasury and trying to involve himself directly in industrial 
disputes, and finally undermining delegated authority to ministers. This ‘capture’ undermined the 
hierarchical institutions and moved them into an isolation dynamic again. The rushed ‘night of the 
long knives’ reshuffle left his authority weakened, and he was unable to maintain a structurally 
despotic position. 
 But, crucially, this qualifies our understanding of ‘capture’. Douglas’s and Mars’s (2003) study 
showed that the position of the charismatic leader in an enclave is not the strong one that its 
rhetoric represents her or him to be, but a strategy for dealing with the limitations on individual 
power created by enclaving: Weber was wrong to take the form of charisma at its face value. In 
the same vein, 6 (2011; 2015a) emphasises the brittleness and fragility of the structurally despotic 
position in isolate ordering: despotic strategies are ways of using imposition to cover improvisation 
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and coping; when they fail, in isolate ordering there is only the position of the structural serf upon 
which to fall back. So too with the concept of ‘capture’. When Mars introduced it as a term of art 
specifically for the neo-Durkheimian institutional theory, he did so with a case in which real veto 
power was seized by a party formally weaker in the central relationship examined. In the case of 
the Macmillan government’s transition from hierarchical into isolate ordering, the capture 
attempted by the prime minister himself proved brittle. Far from resolving anomalies, his guile 
and the drastic reshuffle weakened Macmillan and left him closer to the structural serf than to the 
despotic position after July 1962. The hope of strength from capture turned into weakness. Arrow 
‘A’ in Figure Three was a proxy for ‘capture’, but not as Mars’s East End enclaved warehouse 
workers knew it. Like charisma, capture is much less powerful than it first seems. 
 But this mechanism restates the original puzzle at a new level. For if Macmillan’s intended 
capture of political resources and control was a key part of the transition, how can this be 
reconciled with the unintended character of the transition, unless there remained some process of 
blinkering after all, at least affecting Macmillan’s own intentions? The answer to this recast version 
of the puzzle arises precisely from the fact that the second mechanism was not operating. There 
was no hiatus, but a process running over two or event three years of informal institutional change, 
in which informal hierarchy decayed gradually. Hierarchy was sustained, but in reduced degree 
during 1962 and 1963 by the formal hierarchical institutions of the constitution and the powers 
and role of the prime minister, which remained essential to the legitimation and presentation of 
Macmillan’s strategy even when the government had substantially slipped informally into isolate 
ordering. There was still just enough hierarchy, sustained by formal institutions of the constitution, 
to provide rhetoric to be stolen. 
Conclusion 
Neo-Durkheimian institutional theory explains transitions between elementary forms of informal 
institutions by concentrating on feedback effects within and among those forms. The two 
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fundamental dimensions of institutional variation in institutions are not supposed to be causally 
efficacious in their own right. They provide only descriptive measures of the change to be 
explained. Descriptions which use the two dimensions can be enlightening. It is an important first 
step to discover that, descriptively, deepening social integration in pursuit of hierarchy can 
unintendedly bring about weakening integration, yielding isolate ordering but without apparent 
and obvious leaching away by people in structural isolate serf positions who seek to evade the 
burdens of hierarchical ordering. But the neo-Durkheimian argument is that this cannot constitute 
a convincing explanation. Faced with the appearance of transition between forms brought about 
by a ratchet effect, it proposes that the ratchet cannot be on one dimension of variation causing 
movement on the other, for a dimension of variation is neither a uni- nor a bi-directional 
dimension of causal change. The apparent anomaly between the description of the case and the 
theory is to be resolved by showing that there was in fact negative feedback all along, but that fact 
was obscured by the work of informal institutions cultivating bias for as long as they operate. 
 This article argues that Mars’s proposed mechanism of ‘capture’ can indeed provide a way of 
sustaining a powerful and convincing explanation of such cases of quiet, contrary-to-intended 
transitions between forms. But the concept must be nuanced in ways that are entirely consistent 
with Douglas’s and Mars’s wider appreciation of the fragility of power strategies, when they are 
correctly explained by reference to the informal institutions under which they are adopted and to 
which they are a responses. 
 For the understanding of cabinets as organisations, the significance of the argument is that it 
becomes possible to show remarkable velocity of change in informal institutions. This can explain 
major changes in thought styles that inform political judgement and decision-making. 
 The significance of the argument for the neo-Durkheimian institutional approach is fourfold. 
Methodologically, it brings out the importance of two of Mars’s key contributions to the 
development of the theory – the central importance of understanding how the institutional 
cultivation of rule-violation not only provides a descriptive index of institutional form but also 
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helps to understand the causal mechanisms by which change in institutional form is brought about, 
and how the cross-sectional feedback loop set out in Figure One actually works. In short, the 
seamier side of organisational life is, as Mars has argued throughout his career, causally 
fundamental to institutional change. Theoretically, the argument shows that a category of 
apparently recalcitrant cases can indeed be explained by the neo-Durkheimian machinery. Thirdly, 
the integrity of the theory’s causal machinery can be preserved by the ways in which these 
apparently difficult cases are resolved. Transitions between forms really are the product of negative 
feedback. Positive feedback is a phenomenon of elementary forms, not of dimensions of variation. 
Fourth and finally, although Mars initially borrowed the concept of ‘capture’ from rationalist 
conceptions in the study of legal regulation and economic studies of rent-seeking behaviour, he 
redefined it so that it could be located firmly in neo-Durkheimian institutional dynamics. The result 
is, as he proposed, a key part of a causal mechanism by which these apparently anomalous cases 
can be explained. 
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Figure One. The structure of explanation in neo-Durkheimian institutional theory: a two-
phase feedback loop 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure Two. Positive feedback within elementary forms: the example of hierarchy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure Three. Negative feedback between forms: an example of transition from hierarchy 
to isolate ordering 
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Figure Four. At best a description, not an explanation: an example of transition beginning 
in intended deepening of hierarchy but ending in transition to isolate ordering 
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Table One. Candidate explanatory mechanisms which could be described by arrow ‘A’ in 
Figure Three 
 
Mechanism Feedback type Content Role of rule-
violation and 
trust 
Explanation for the 
fact that between- 
form noise is 
suppressed 
Blinkering and 
stolen rhetoric 
Disguised 
negative 
feedback 
Initial strength of 
hierarchy misleads 
actors, prevents 
recognition of entry 
into isolate ordering 
until much later 
(continued, rather 
than ‘stolen’ 
rhetoric) 
Rule violation 
reinforces 
misplaced 
trust 
Actors generally 
do not recognise 
transition 
Disorganisation 
and replacement 
Disguised 
positive 
feedback in 
hierarchy, then 
disguised 
positive 
feedback in 
isolate ordering 
Reinforcement of 
hierarchy proceeds 
so far as to lead to 
disorganisation of 
hierarchy, and 
people then reach 
for isolate ordering 
in the space opened 
up by the 
disorganisation of 
hierarchy 
Rule violation 
undermines 
well-placed 
trust 
Actors only 
recognise 
justifications for 
alternative 
institutional 
ordering when 
hierarchy has 
already reached 
disorganisation 
Capture Disguised 
negative 
feedback 
Some actors in 
isolate ordering 
capture resources 
and recognise the 
fact that this does 
undermine 
hierarchical 
ordering, but are 
able to legitimate 
this with other 
actors in terms 
recognised in 
hierarchy (‘stolen 
rhetoric’) 
Rule violation 
violates trust, 
in fact 
replaces 
power based 
on trust with 
power 
without 
consent  
Disadvantaged 
actors do not 
recognise the 
transition 
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Table Two. Dramatis personae 
 
Name (title as it was in 1957-
63; subsequent titles not 
shown) 
Role in cabinet 1957-1963 
Harold Macmillan Prime Minister, Jan 1957- Oct 1963 
RA Butler Home Secretary Jan 1957-July 1962; Deputy prime 
Minister July 1962-Oct 1963;  
Former Chancellor and Leader of the House. Had been 
rival to Macmillan for leadership in 1957 
Iain Macleod Minister of Labour and National Service 1955-Oct 1959; 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oct 1959-Jul 1961; 
Chancellor of Duchy of Lancaster and Conservative party 
chairman, Oct 1961-1963 
Selwyn Lloyd Foreign Secretary, 1955-Jul 1960; Chancellor of 
Exchequer, Jul 1960-Jul 1962 
Earl of Home Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 1955-Jul 
1960; Leader, House of Lords, Mar 1957-Jul 1960; Foreign 
Secretary, Jul 1960-Oct 1963 
Duncan Sandys Secretary of State for Defence, Jan 1957-Oct 1959; 
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Jul 1960-
Jul 1962; Secretary of State for Colonies, Jul 1962-Oct 
1964 
Peter Thorneycroft Chancellor of Exchequer Jan 1957- Jan 1958 
Resigned when cabinet refused to agree to his proposed 
expenditure cuts 
Minister of Aviation, Jul 1960-Jul 1962; Secretary of State 
for Defence, Jul 1962-Oct 1964 
Enoch Powell Financial Secretary, Jan 1957- Jan 1958; resigned with 
Thorneycroft 
Jul 1960-Oct 1963: Secretary of State for Health 
Reginald Maudling Paymaster-General, Jan 1957-Oct 1959; President, Board 
of Trade, Oct 1959-Oct 1961; Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, Oct 1961-Jul 1962; Chancellor of Exchequer, Jul 
1962-Oct 1964 
Jack Profumo Secretary of State for War, Jul 1960- June 1963 
Edward Heath Chief Whip, 1955-Oct 1959; Minister of Labour and 
National Service, Oct 1959-Jul 1960; Lord Privy Seal 
(responsible for EEC application), Feb 1960-Oct 1963 
John Hare Secretary of State for War 1956-Jan 1958; Minister of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Jan 1958-Jul 1960; 
Minister of Labour, Jul 1960-Oct 1963 
Richard Wood Minister of Power, Oct 1959-Oct 1963 
Robert Cecil, Marquess of 
Salisbury 
Lord President of Council and leader, House of Lords, 
1952- Mar 1957, resigned over disagreements with 
Macmillan on decolonisation and handling of Cyprus 
  
Other persons mentioned in 
text 
Role relevant to mention in text 
Anthony Eden Prime Minister 1955- Jan1957. Responsible for key 
decisions over Suez crisis 1956. Resigned due to ill-health. 
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Richard Beeching (first) Chairman of British Railways Board Mar 1961-1965; 
responsible for controversial closures of unprofitable lines 
and major reorganisation of rail industry 
Claude Guillebaud Professor of Economics, University of Cambridge; after 
conducting review pay in NHS, appointed to review pay 
structures in rail industry 1959-1960. 
Edwin Plowden Former Treasury official turned business leader, Chair 
Tube Investments; chaired 1959-60 committee which 
recommended system of spending control later 
implemented as Public Expenditure Survey Committee 
from 1961  
Charles De Gaulle President of France, 1958-1969 
John Fitzgerald Kennedy President of United States 1961-1963 
Robert McNamara Secretary of Defense, United States, 1961-1968 
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Table Three. Key types of rule-violation cultivated in the Macmillan government’s 
isolation dynamic 
 
Rule violations Internal  External 
 Not policy oriented Policy-oriented Policy-oriented 
Anomaly-generating 
 
Lies to colleagues 
about sexual 
indiscretions 
Guile in relaxing 
agreed policy 
Violations of incomes 
policy norms for 
conciliation or in 
pursuit of macro-
economic expansion 
Anomaly-managing 
 
Guile in asking 
colleagues to watch 
other colleagues’ 
decisions 
Instituting inquiries to 
distract press 
Side-deals with trades 
unions and 
nationalised industry 
directors 
 
